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National security strategy has been defined as the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the
instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute
to national security.[1] The purpose of this article is to present a case study of how the People's Republic of China is
successfully applying all four instruments of national power to enhance its relationship with the Kingdom of Cambodia
as part of a national security strategy of building regional alliances to counter US influence and to ensure China's
security in Southeast Asia.
Since 1955 China's stated foreign policy has centered on five "Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."[2] But in the words
of China scholar Michael Yahuda, "An immense gap exists between the declaratory principles of friendship, equality,
mutual benefit, and noninterference that supposedly guide Chinese diplomacy, and the actual conduct of China's
foreign policy, which is characterized by an exceptionally high dose of realism and a lack of openness."[3] China rails
against "hegemonism," meaning America as the only superpower, and "power politics," meaning America's tendency
to use force as a substitute for foreign policy.
A means to counter American influence might be alliances, yet China has few. Columbia Professor Samuel Kim calls
China a "group of one" because of its tendency to see itself as set apart from others.[4] This may be changing. Chinese
relations with Pakistan and Russia may be moving toward formal alliances, and in Southeast Asia China's relations
with Burma, Cambodia, and, most recently, Indonesia may be a sign of things to come. Yan Xuetong of the China
Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a research center affiliated with the Chinese equivalent of the CIA,
stated in the China Daily recently, "Diplomacy is a fine art, but its essence is simple: to push for maximum
international support while upholding national interests. Achieving both can fortify a region militarily and put its
economy on par with the world's best. China should take note here and apply diplomacy to foster good neighbor
relations. Developing good relations, especially with Southeast Asian nations, should be China's priority."[5] Yan goes
on to say that "China's national interest cannot be separated economically, militarily, or politically from the interests of
other Asian countries," and "tighter regional relations can also help defuse international hegemonism by the United
States because regional alliances can rival US power and cut into its influence." Although couched in the language of
shared interests, Yan's commentary reflects the geopolitical reality that China is competing with the United States for
influence in Southeast Asia.[6] It is the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) closest to
the United States, including two treaty allies, which stand in the way of China's dominance of that part of Asia.[7] If
China can maintain a divided ASEAN, it can prevent an anti-China security consensus from developing. China is
pursuing relationships with Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia with this probable objective. This article discusses the
application and coordination of China's instruments of national power to build a closer relationship with an unlikely
partner, Cambodia.
Historical Ties
A close China-Cambodia relationship appears awkward on the surface because China was the devoted and dedicated
patron of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge from its inception in the 1960s through insurgency, conquest, genocide,
defeat, insurgency, and peace.[8] Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, by contrast, has dedicated his life since 1977 to
destroying the Khmer Rouge movement in which he was once a battalion commander. Although it was the People's
Army of Vietnam that pushed the Khmer Rouge into Thailand in January 1979, it was Hun Sen and his peers in the
Cambodian People's Party that assumed political leadership, led Cambodia into the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, and,

arguably, earned a place in two coalition governments following elections in 1993 and 1998. Hun Sen wrote in a 1988
essay that China was the root of all that was evil in Cambodia. But just as Cambodia and Cambodians are
demonstrating an almost unfathomable capacity to let bygones be bygones with regard to the former Khmer Rouge,
Hun Sen has now buried the past and is embracing China, which he sees as a means of bringing economic
development to Cambodia.

Figure 1. Cambodia and China.

There are other factors that make a close Sino-Cambodian relationship possible. The most important, as I will discuss
shortly, is the role of Cambodia's ethnic Chinese. Although persecuted by the Khmer Rouge, historically Cambodia's
Chinese have been relatively well-integrated members of society. They have miraculously rebounded from a 20-year
period of repression that began with legalized discrimination under Lon Nol from 1970 to 1975, deteriorated into
horrific ethnic cleansing under the Khmer Rouge that reduced their numbers from 430,000 in 1975 to 215,000 in 1979,
and continued as official discrimination under the Vietnamese from 1979 to 1989. They now once again dominate
commerce, just as they generally have since the 15th century, when Phnom Penh evolved as Cambodia's capital based
on its status as a trading port dominated by Cantonese Chinese.[9] Historically, Cambodia's indigenous Chinese were
not rice farmers like most Cambodians, but rather the buyers to whom the farmers sold their surplus, and the merchants
who sold everything else of use in an agricultural society. They are once again returning to these functions, and their
economic capacity is being multiplied by an influx of Chinese investment, both official and private, that would be the
envy of any developing country.
Another factor enabling a Sino-Cambodian relationship is King Sihanouk. Cambodia has enjoyed a unique and special
position in Chinese foreign policy since Zhou Enlai befriended Sihanouk at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in
1955. After diplomatic recognition in 1958, Cambodia became the first noncommunist country to receive official aid
from the PRC. The honeymoon continued until 1967 when two facets of Chinese foreign policy collided in Cambodia.

One, support to communist insurgency, in this case the Khmer Rouge, was clandestine and duplicitous. When armed
revolt began in April 1967, Sihanouk at first suspected the North Vietnamese, but within a month he had decided that
the Chinese were the real force behind les Khmer Rouges (a name he coined). The other facet, a spillover from the
Cultural Revolution, was an open anti-Sihanouk leftism promoted by the Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh that led
Sihanouk to almost sever relations in the summer of 1967.[10] That was just a bump in the road, however, because in
1970 China housed Sihanouk when Lon Nol overthrew him, and in 1979 China embraced Sihanouk when he was again
forced into exile. Sihanouk maintains a residence in Beijing, and he is careful to ensure that he is always seen as
supporting China.
Diplomatic Initiatives
On 5 and 6 July 1997, a faction of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces loyal to "Second Prime Minister" Hun Sen
attacked and defeated another faction of the military loyal to "First Prime Minister" Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the
King's son and leader of the FUNCINPEC Party (the National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, and
Cooperative Cambodia). In a series of battles beginning west of the airport and eventually reaching Ranariddh's
residence one block from the American Embassy, infantry, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and even mortars
terrorized Phnom Penh and her one million residents. Ranariddh was out of the country, and he did not return until
nearly a year later. Following the fighting, Hun Sen claimed that Taiwan had been covertly supporting the
FUNCINPEC forces, and he promptly expelled Taiwan's unofficial liaison office from Phnom Penh.[11]
Hun Sen's expulsion of Taiwan's liaison office endeared him to China and opened the door for Chinese diplomatic
initiatives. The fact that the United States suspended all military cooperation and economic assistance at the same time
no doubt made the opportunity that much more attractive. China recognized the new government in meetings in midAugust with Hun Sen and Ung Huot, the new FUNCINPEC First Prime Minister, when they traveled to Beijing to visit
King Sihanouk. Chinese Premier Li Peng told Hun Sen and Ung Huot that China would "never interfere" in
Cambodia's internal politics, and that Cambodia's problems "must be resolved by the Cambodian people."[12] At the
end of September, Hun Sen's Chief of Cabinet led another delegation to China to meet with the Chinese Trade
Minister and other officials to draft memoranda of understanding on assistance for agriculture, power, fisheries, and
maritime transport. In December, China delivered 116 military cargo trucks and 70 jeeps valued at $2.8 million in what
both sides claimed was part of a deal that pre-dated the events of 5 and 6 July. At the ceremony to receive the vehicles,
Hun Sen praised China's sympathetic attitude toward post-July Cambodia:
Although some international community members have not yet clearly understood the real situation in
Cambodia, a number of friendly countries have maintained their just and fair stance on the Cambodian
issue. Among them, the PRC, which has firmly adhered to the principle of peaceful coexistence, continues
to respect the Kingdom of Cambodia's independence and sovereignty and does not poke its nose into
Cambodian internal affairs.[13]
Cambodia's obligations in the diplomatic exchange are to comply with several relatively painless Chinese requirements
in exchange for much-needed investment. First and foremost is support for China's "one-China" policy. King
Sihanouk, President of the National Assembly Prince Ranariddh, and Prime Minister Hun Sen have strongly and
repeatedly reiterated Cambodia's support for "one-China" in a number of public statements and actions.[14] In August
1999 King Sihanouk even wrote Hun Sen to suggest that the government ban Taiwanese investors from displaying the
Republic of China flag or engaging in other such "subversive activities" on Taiwan's National Day.[15] Hun Sen has
steadfastly refused to even consider allowing Taiwan to reopen an unofficial liaison office, to include squashing a
November 1998 agreement by the Phnom Penh municipal government to allow Taipei City to open a cultural and
economic liaison office.[16] Fortunately for Cambodia, stiff-arming Taiwan has had minimal effect on Taiwanese
investment, which continues to compare favorably with that from China and Malaysia. Second, Cambodia has allowed
China to actively assist in the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese community. Third, Cambodia
has cooperated fully in Chinese investment activity in Cambodia. The latter two postures both support Cambodia's
economic development, and thus agreement required no real sacrifice on Hun Sen's part.
Although domestic political opponents and opposition newspapers have criticized Hun Sen for playing the China card
and pandering to China, there is little audience for such criticism. The biggest payoff for Cambodia thus far came in

February 1999 when Hun Sen paid an official visit to Beijing. Hun Sen obtained $18.3 million in foreign assistance
guarantees and $200 million in no-interest loans for infrastructure projects, and China summarized the visit as "a new
high" in Cambodia-China relations.[17] China acknowledges that the $218 million figure is one of the highest aid
amounts they provide to any country in the world.[18]
Informational Leverage
The informational instrument of national power can include the use of culture to influence the actions of other states
and peoples. China, with her rich history and strong cultural ties to ethnic Chinese everywhere, regardless of
nationality or ideology, is particularly well suited to exercise this instrument of power. Overseas Chinese, for their part,
have a unique ability to display immense pride in China's achievements and Chinese culture while at the same time
acknowledging that they would not willingly agree to live under communism.
China's support of the cultural revival of Cambodia's Chinese community has focused primarily on the promotion of
the Chinese language. In 1970 there were over 200 Chinese schools in Cambodia, serving approximately 150,000
students. The five largest of these schools were in Phnom Penh. They were called public schools because school boards
administered them, but tuition was still required. The remainder were purely private institutions. Students at these
schools either did not pursue a Cambodian education, or pursued it half-days. In 1970 Lon Nol ordered all Chinese
schools closed because of the perceived role that they played in spreading subversion (an ironic decision given that
Lon Nol and his wife were Chinese-Cambodian, and Lon Nol had Taiwanese advisors from 1972 to 1975). The
Vietnamese who occupied Cambodia from 1979 to 1989 continued the ban on Chinese culture, and it was not until
Prime Minister Hun Sen issued a decree in 1990 permitting multilingual education and allowing minorities the right of
association that reviving Chinese-language education became possible.[19]
Hun Sen's personal interest in reviving Cambodia's ethnic Chinese community likely grew from a combination of
economic and personal factors. Economically, Hun Sen was convinced by 1990 that only capitalism could bring
development to Cambodia.[20] Personally, Hun Sen and his wife both grew up in villages along the Mekong River in
an area of Kampong Cham Province rich with ethnic Cham and Cambodian Chinese.[21] It may be more than
coincidence, then, that the first Chinese-language school to open in Cambodia in 21 years, in November 1991 in
Memot, was in a remote part of Kampong Cham Province where Hun Sen's brother was governor and where Hun Sen
had been based as an insurgent years before.[22]
The growth of Chinese-language education and the revival of the Chinese community expanded dramatically in 1998
and 1999, in no small part due to assistance and encouragement from China. After increasing from 13 schools in
December 1995 to 60 in September 1999, the number was up to 70 by December 1999 and continues to grow. The
Chinese government's role has included providing partial funding for school construction, influencing the Cambodian
government to return Chinese schools that were confiscated by previous regimes (but buying them back if necessary),
producing textbooks incorporating Cambodian history and geography at Jinan University in China, conducting
inspection visits, and funding participation in conferences on Chinese-language teaching in China and other Asian
countries.
The success of the Chinese-language schools can be seen in the fact that one elementary school in Phnom Penh has
over 10,000 students and claims to be the largest overseas Chinese school in the world.[23] The principal and over half
of the teachers are from China, a situation common to most of the "public" Chinese schools. A sample of the
informational instrument of national power at work in microcosm was seen in this school after the United States
bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. At the same time that Chinese investors in Cambodia were
protesting outside the US Embassy in Phnom Penh, the mainland Chinese principal began a month-long campaign to
"combat Western influences" among his pupils.[24]
In 1998 China began offering scholarships for Chinese-Cambodians to attend high school and college in China, and in
1999 Fujian Province's Overseas Chinese University (and affiliated high school), established by Zhou Enlai in 1960,
began advertising discounted tuition for Cambodian-Chinese.[25] A Cambodian-Chinese Association established a
Chinese Language Primary School Teacher's Training Course in Phnom Penh in March of 1999, and the Chinese
Language Propagation Office of China's State Council dispatched three professional educators to form the faculty. The

first one-year course graduated in February 2000.[26]
Besides influencing the attitudes of Chinese Cambodians, a further noteworthy phenomenon associated with the growth
of the Chinese-language schools is the increasing number of ethnic Khmer that are enrolling. Estimates run as high as
30 percent of students. In an essay published in a local newspaper, a sixth-grade student in a provincial Chinese
school wrote of the challenges teachers were facing with the influx of Cambodian students, but she concluded that
ultimately the stricter discipline and better learning environment were good for her new classmates.[27]
A significant enabler of the growth of Chinese-language education has been the publication of a Chinese-language
newspaper in Phnom Penh beginning in December 1993.[28] Articles highlight the educational revival, and schools can
advertise for students and conduct fundraising that has reached out to Chinese-Cambodians as far away as Paris. The
paper plays an active role in the community, to include publishing at least one student essay per day. A sign of official
approval of the resurgence of the Chinese language was the initiation of a nightly Chinese-language television news
broadcast on a government channel in June 1998, although the official rationale was to accommodate Chinese-speaking
investors.[29]
Another area in which China applies the informational instrument of national power is support for Chinese-Cambodian
social organizations. On 26 November 1990, following Hun Sen's decree restoring certain rights to Cambodia's
minorities including the right of association, an organization called the Cambodian-Chinese General Assembly began
in Phnom Penh "with a desk."[30] This organization sought to serve as an umbrella group for the revival of Chinese
social institutions that had been dormant for 15 to 20 years. There was no organization with this exact name
previously, but it was functionally similar to a Council of Congrégation Chiefs that as early as 1863 had served a
supervisory role over the Chinese community in Cambodia by resolving disputes and setting overall direction for
ethnic Chinese.[31] The five congrégations whose chiefs made up the council were hometown associations made up of
Chinese immigrants and their descendants from Chaozhou (Teochiu) City, Guangzhou (Canton) City, Fujian (Hokkien)
Province, Hainan Province, and the non-geographic Kejiaren (Hakka). These associations, sometimes referred to as
guilds, were responsible for tax collection, identity cards, resident permits, and a variety of social welfare functions
until 1958, when their legal authority was taken away. The associations continued to perform community functions
such as managing cemeteries, schools, sports clubs, and a hospital until the Khmer Rouge obliterated them. They have
now returned, and they are thriving.
China's tactic has been to focus its efforts on the largest grouping, the Cambodian-Chinese General Assembly. By
routing most coordination efforts through the assembly, China has lent its weight to an overarching organization that
can guide the community. For instance, the Chinese-language schools that the Chinese Embassy agrees to support
financially are only those run by school boards made up of members of a provincial, district, or, if in Phnom Penh,
hometown (Teochiu, Hokkien, Hakka, Hainan, Canton) Cambodian-Chinese Association. The Embassy first provides
the funds to the General Assembly, which further disburses to the school boards, thus strengthening the position of the
General Assembly. In fact in the recent elections to select the third leadership council (apparently on three-year terms),
the previous head of the Education Office, who simultaneously held the office of Vice President, was elected as the
new President.[32]
From 1990 to 1999 the assembly and subordinate organizations grew from nothing to five hometown associations, 18
provincial chapters, 38 district chapters, 70 Chinese schools serving more than 50,000 students, a headquarters and
library built with the support of the Chinese Embassy, a training course for Chinese teachers, and a partnership with a
packaging company from Guangxi to generate operating income.[33] Among the organizations just listed there are
varying degrees of subordination ranging from direct ownership to indirect control (e.g., the hometown associations
and the private Chinese schools are independent), but in most cases there is a benefit to the hierarchical relationship.
Business relationships, for instance, often start within these associations, and typically the richer the businessman, the
higher the position he will have in the association structure.
China's support of the Cambodian-Chinese General Assembly includes trips to China. In addition to the education
conferences already mentioned, in 1998 the Guangdong Province People's Government Overseas Chinese Affairs
Office hosted a nine-person delegation to attend a PRC 49th anniversary celebration followed by a ten-day tour of
China. In 1999 Beijing authorities extended a similar invitation to the then Vice President (now President) of the

assembly and three others to attend the 50th anniversary celebrations in Beijing.[34]
China's objective in cultivating the Chinese-Cambodian community--something it most certainly did not do during
1975-1979 when the Khmer Rouge killed one of every two Chinese-Cambodians despite the presence of several
thousand PRC advisors--can be seen in comments that the Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia made to a Guangdong
television crew filming a special on Cambodia's ethnic Chinese in February 2000. Ambassador Yan Tingai said that the
Cambodian government greatly appreciates the role the Chinese-Cambodians are playing in economic reconstruction.
He added that the "popularization of the Chinese language in Cambodia far exceeds that in any other Southeast Asian
country. This feather in the cap of Cambodia's Chinese has made an enormous contribution to both glorifying Chinese
culture and developing the friendship between Cambodia and China."[35]
Given that the Khmer Rouge nearly destroyed Cambodia's own proud cultural heritage, resentment of China's
aggressive support of Chinese culture could be a potential source of friction within Cambodian society.[36] This has
likely not occurred because China balances the support of Chinese culture with economic development projects that
affect all Cambodians, and because the Cambodian leadership fully supports and in many cases participates in many of
the activities that bring the Chinese-Cambodian community into contact with the Chinese Embassy, Chinese aid
personnel, and Chinese businessmen. Some senior members of the Cambodian People's Party have personal
connections with China that influence their attitudes, such as Senate President Chea Sim educating his son in
Hainan,[37] and other key politicians are Chinese-Cambodian themselves, such as Minister of State Sok An
(Cambodian People's Party), Minister of State and Information Minister Lu Laysreng (FUNCINPEC), and Minister of
Construction Im Chhum Lim (CPP). Phnom Penh Mayor Chea Sophara (CPP) has never publicly stated that he is of
Chinese descent, but he has acknowledged studying Chinese and enrolling his children in Chinese schools. Mayor
Chea is so active within the Cambodian Chinese community that he gives the impression of being in a political
campaign.[38] Given the wealth that the ethnic Chinese control, this is probably not an unwise strategy. In the national
election in July 1998, three political parties, including the winning Cambodian People's Party, published Chineselanguage campaign literature.[39] The bottom line is that neither at the man-on-the street level nor among the political
leadership does China's promotion of Chinese culture cause undue concern.
Economic Cooperation
As a totalitarian government with elements of a market economy, the PRC possesses a unique ability to apply the
economic instrument of national power to assist a developing country. Besides the obvious tool of grant economic
assistance, state-run enterprises that are subordinate to government organs also have the capability to invest abroad.
Chinese investment in Cambodia tripled from 1997 to 1998, and went up another 40 percent in 1999, making China
Cambodia's first or second largest source of foreign investment.[40]
Besides encouraging and even coordinating the efforts of Chinese enterprises to invest in Cambodia, the PRC practices
a unique method of dispensing its official aid entirely through contracts to Chinese firms, many of which are
themselves government entities. This proto-capitalist process is similar to the manner in which the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) awards contracts for everything from road building to democracy development,
although by contrast the Chinese process is not open to public scrutiny, and USAID does not generally contract other
agencies within the US government. It is apparent from the wide range of state-run Chinese enterprises active in
Cambodia that there is an effort to spread the wealth among a range of enterprises. Many of these corporations, in
particular those subordinate to Chinese provincial governments, specialize in overseas economic development, and
some have also garnered Asian Development Bank and World Bank contracts for development projects in
Cambodia.[41]
Official Chinese involvement in encouraging investment in Cambodia is also evident in the continuous stream of
investment delegations that have visited Cambodia since 1998. One of the most significant visits occurred shortly after
Hun Sen's visit to Beijing in February 1999. Mr. Wang Jun, the Chairman of the China International Trade and
Investment Corporation (CITIC), the investment arm of the State Council, spent several days in March 1999 discussing
with both Hun Sen and the Minister of Commerce a tax-free manufacturing zone near Sihanoukville.[42] Mr. Wang is
also Chairman of Polytechnologies, the largest corporate entity owned by the People's Liberation Army. A month after
Wang's visit a new Cambodian company with Cambodian-Chinese management announced that it had received official

approval to serve as CITIC's partner in the tax-free industrial zone.[43]
Another facet of Chinese assistance to Cambodia's economic development is official encouragement of business links
between the hometown associations in Cambodia and potential investors from those areas in China. This is especially
true with regard to private and semi-private firms from Guangdong Province, the ancestral home of approximately 90
percent of Cambodia's Chinese. Business contacts are facilitated through the Overseas Chinese Liaison Offices of
Guangdong Province and Guangzhou, Shantou, Jieyang, and Chaozhou cities. A number of delegations of private
businessmen from Guangdong have visited Cambodia through this means, and often a Chinese-Cambodian tycoon,
Theng Bunma, hosts them. Theng, who once shot out the tire of a Cambodian airliner for losing his luggage, is the
premier example of how personal connections in both China and Cambodia mix. In a promotional brochure dated
March 1999 titled "Tying the Knot Between Cambodia and China," Theng displays photographs of receiving awards
from both King Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen, as well as photographs of visits with the Chairman of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Director of the State Council Office of Overseas Chinese
Affairs, the Communist Party Secretary of Shantou City, and a variety of lesser officials and business partners in
China, including an alternate member of the Central Committee.[44] Featured prominently in the brochure is a
business partner, Indonesian Ted Sioeng. Sioeng was the key figure in the illegal Chinese attempts to influence
American elections in 1995 and 1996, and he is well connected at numerous levels of the Chinese Communist Party,
including the United Front Work Department of the Chinese People's Consultative Congress that oversees Beijing's
efforts to build influence among Chinese communities in foreign countries.[45]
An additional factor in China's ability to leverage the economic instrument of national power is the degree to which the
local Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Hong Kong and Macau Business Association are active in both the
domestic and international political scenes in Cambodia. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce is composed of
businesses from China. They regularly hold combined seminars with the Economic-Commercial Office of the Embassy
for new and current investors. They make contributions to worthy causes such as providing uniforms for Cambodia's
national basketball squad. They also play politics. Just five days before the national election in July 1998, for instance,
the Cambodian Chief of Police flew the President of the Chamber to the western city of Pailin in a government
helicopter to sign a $6 million agreement between her company, a Cambodian partner, and the municipality to invest
in infrastructure projects.[46] What appears to have been a Tammany Hall attempt to buy the loyalty of the ex-Khmer
Rouge municipality failed, however, when Pailin elected a member of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party to the National
Assembly.
The Chamber also led demonstrations outside the US Embassy in May 1999 to protest the American bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and in March 2000 it held a special session attended by 30 Chinese businesses to voice
their support for China's White Paper on the Taiwan problem.[47] The Hong Kong and Macau Business Association
held a similar session in which it condemned "any outside country that speaks without authority out of both sides of its
mouth while moving closer to wild hegemonism."[48] As a business organization whose 100 members include a large
number of garment factories exporting 90 percent of their product to the United States, the necessity for such vitriol is
not clear. Nevertheless, they pledged in a quarter-page, red-ink ad on the front of the local Chinese newspaper to
"resolutely uphold and support" China's position on Taiwan.[49]
Last but not least, Chinese enterprises in Cambodia are highly dependent on the Chinese-Cambodian community for
everything from accountants to shop foremen to janitors.[50] That symbiotic relationship increases both the economic
and political status of Chinese Cambodians, and it provides an additional means through which China can leverage the
economic instrument of national power. Part of that relationship is the coveted opportunity for international travel and
training, and China's proximity and affordability make it a workable option for staff training--provided the staff speak
Chinese. A private bank in Phnom Penh which claims to have 33 percent of all savings accounts in Cambodia, for
instance, recently began sending staff to Sun Yatsen University in Guangzhou for advanced schooling in business
management.[51]
Military Initiatives
The first post-July 1997 indicator of increased security cooperation between the PRC and Cambodia arrived quite
visibly in late 1997 in the form of the 186 trucks and jeeps mentioned earlier, although the soft-loan purchase

agreement probably was made before July 1997. It is likely that when Hun Sen and Ung Huot were in Beijing in
August 1997 they signed an agreement for law-enforcement training assistance, because in August 1998 China sent a
police training team to Cambodia to provide two weeks of training in investigative techniques and physical security to
100 Cambodian policemen as part of a 21 August 1997 agreement.[52]
A series of high-level visits in 1999 may serve as the precursor for increased cooperation. Cambodia's Co-Defense
Ministers, Tea Banh and Prince Sisowath Sirirath, traveled to China for five days in March 1999 at the invitation of
Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian. They met with Vice President Hu Jintao and Chief of the PLA General Staff
Fu Quanyou.[53] In a summary of PLA achievements for 1999, China called this visit an indicator of the emergence
of China's foreign military relations "as an energetic and dynamic part of China's all-around foreign policy."[54] In
October 1999, at the invitation of Fu Quanyou, a 12-member Cambodian delegation headed by armed forces
Commander-in-Chief General Ke Kim Yan--and including army commander Lieutenant General Meas Sophea and the
commanders of the navy and air force--visited Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.[55] Shortly thereafter, Zhou
Kunren, the Senior Commissar of the PLA Logistics Department, visited Cambodia.[56] An unconfirmed Cambodian
press report claims that Zhou offered Cambodia 250 tanks, 230 artillery pieces, 100 military trucks, and an undisclosed
number of machine guns, with Hun Sen reportedly responding that he would accept the aid but not at this time.[57]
More believable is the arrival in December 1999 of $1.5 million in construction materiel for new barracks, ten jeeps,
ten ambulances, and parachutes for the Cambodian armed forces' one parachute battalion.[58] Also in late 1999 China
hosted Cambodian military personnel at a PLA engineering school for a 20-day course in humanitarian demining.[59]
Although these military contacts are only a beginning, it is likely that they will grow in much the same way that China
has developed military ties with other developing nations. A significant difference is that Cambodia simply does not
have the funds to buy Chinese hardware, nor is Hun Sen likely to ask to divert any significant portion of the $200
million in credits (as well as remaining aid from previous years). Cambodia would send military personnel to China
for training and would accept Chinese training assistance if offered.[60]
Strategic Implications
The purpose of this article has been to present a descriptive study of China's direct and indirect application of the four
instruments of national power to achieve objectives in Cambodia that contribute to China's national security. What are
those objectives? The diplomatic is perhaps most clear: Cambodia's support in the United Nations and as a spoiler in
ASEAN would be useful to China. The economic objective is less clear. Cambodia has great potential to become a
major producer of agricultural products such as natural oils, rice, and seafood, but its 11.3 million people are an
extremely minor market for Chinese goods. The information objective of promoting Chinese culture and the idea of a
Greater China supports the other instruments by enhancing the interdependence between Cambodia's Chinese, its
economy, and its politics.
The military objective, in the long term, stands to make the greatest contribution to China's national security.
Cambodia sits in a critical geostrategic position, and China has since 1955 demonstrated an almost bewildering desire
for access to Cambodia, whether the purpose was to counter US influence, to funnel supplies to North Vietnam and the
Viet Cong, or to counter Vietnam. During the height of Sino-Cambodian relations, during the Pol Pot Khmer Rouge
regime, PLA engineers supervised the slave-labor construction of an airfield at Kampong Chhnang that was (and is)
capable of handling any aircraft in the world. Given that the Khmer Rouge had no air force and that the base included
a command center built into a nearby mountain, the facility was clearly intended as a forward base for the PLA air
force.
Today, China's increasing exports and an increasing demand for oil are driving the Chinese navy to pay more attention
to sea-lanes, as reflected by the plan to augment the existing three fleets with a roving fourth force to reinforce the
other fleets and to project power into the South China Sea and the Pacific and Indian oceans.[61] Situated in the center
of mainland Southeast Asia, the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville would provide an excellent base for projecting
maritime power into the Gulf of Thailand and the Straits of Malacca. Cambodian airfields could also make up for
China's lack of in-flight refueling capacity for warplanes providing maritime air cover. Such bases would not only
protect China's interests, they would drive a wedge both within ASEAN and between ASEAN and the United States.

Clearly China has exercised all four instruments of power--diplomatic, informational, economic, and military--to
improve its relationship with Cambodia. In doing so, it continues to promote its national strategy of building regional
alliances to counter US influence and to strengthen its own security in Southeast Asia.
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